In this article I intend to show that the inference problem, one of the main objections raised against the anti-Humean theory of natural laws defended by Dretske, Tooley and Armstrong (?DTA theory? for short), can be successfully answered. First, I argue that a proper solution should meet two essential requirements that the proposals made by the DTA theorists do not satisfy. Then I state a solution to the inference problem that assumes a local immanentistic view of universals, a partial definition (...) of the nomic necessitation relation as a relation of existential dependence, and a principle constraining multiple occupancy. I also argue that my solution meets the two requirements. Finally, I deal with non-standard laws such as exclusion laws, causal laws and laws involving spatiotemporal parameters. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with Armstrong's last theory of states of affairs and its relation to truthmakers for sentences and the problem of uní versáis. More specifically, I discuss his truthmaker principie, rejecting some of the objections that has been raised against it. However, I also try to show that Armstrong's answer to the problem of the negative existencial sentences in terms of totality states of affairs is mistaken. Finally, I rebut Oliver's slinghot argument against truthmakers and also discuss (...) Armstrong theory of states of affairs as truthmakers. /// Este artículo trata de la última teoría de los estados de cosas de Armstrong, así como de su relación con los hacedores de verdad de los enunciados y con el problema de los universales. En particular, se discute su principio del hacedor de verdad, y se rechazan algunas de las objeciones que se han presentado al mismo. Por otra parte, se intenta mostrar también que la respuesta de Armstrong al problema de los enunciados existenciales negativos en términos de estados de cosas de totalidad es errónea. Finalmente, también se objeta la versión de Oliver del argumento de la honda y se discute la teoría de los hacedores de verdad como los estados de cosas. (shrink)

In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar’s way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen’s specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach.

Armstrong (1983) poses two requirements that law-statements must satisfy in order to support the corresponding counterfactuals. He also argues that law-statements can not satisfy one of these requirements if they merely express regularities, although both requirements are satisfied if law-statements are interpreted as expressing relations between universals. I try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be raised against Armstrong’s own solution by adding three premisses to it: the inference thesis, the contingency thesis and a principle whose rationality I also argue (...) for. Finally, I offer a more reasonable alternative condition for nomic counterfactual supporting which is satisfied by law-statements if they are interpreted as expressing relations between universals, but not so if we interpret them as mere regularities. (shrink)

The general aim of this paper is to defend a theory of properties grounded on universals and the notion of substratum. We offer first a brief survey of some problems concerning the attribution of properties to objects and the similarity of objects. We next characterize the notion of universal by contrasting universals against other entities that have often been postulated in order to account for the mentioned problems. Besides, we distinguish two different theories of properties, both based on the notion (...) of universal: the bundle theory of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to some of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to some of the serious objections that have been posed against the substratum theory. Firstly, we argue that the theory of temporal stages can solve some problems deriving from the substantial change and the accidental change; moreover, we give a reply to some objections advanced against this substratum as a bare particular. Thirdly, we discuss some objections to the use that the substratum theory makes of these bare particulars as individuators. Our reply is based on a distinction between three different roles that can be ascribed to an entity: a particularizer role and two kinds of individuatory roles . We argue that a substratum can perfectly play a rol as a particularizer and also as an intraworld individuator. Finally, we offer a solution to the well known Bradley´s regressum. (shrink)

I will consider Armstrong's problems in trying to account for structural universals, i.e., a kind of complex universal whose instantiation by particulars involves different parts of those particulars instantiating several basic properties and relations, such as the property of being a molecule of methane. I present and criticise Armstrong's most recent attempt to explain structural properties by means of the identification of universals with types of states of affairs and I state my own solution to the problem by appealing to (...) formal relations holding between particulars. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.1 (2000) 49-77 [Access article in PDF] The Time of the King Gift and Exchange in Zorrilla's Don Juan Tenorio Joan Ramon Resina There is something paradoxical about José Zorrilla's revision of the Don Juan legend, a certain contradiction between the play's structure and the logic of the action. The character of the protagonist, the form and implications of Don Juan's salvation, the strategies and temporality of (...) seduction, even the play's generic status--all come under the law of self-cancellation. And so does the historical time in which the play is set: the time of absolute monarchy. The proportionality between terrestrial and eschatological time, organic to the play's Golden Age precursor, 1 is strangely neutralized in Zorrilla's work through an expanding temporality without equivalent in the afterlife; and the same is true of the king's dramatic role through his removal from the scene, which he regulates nonetheless as deus ex machina of the social edifice.A nineteenth-century reader, Francesc Pi i Margall, remarked that "Zorrilla hace a Don Juan escéptico o creyente según lo van exigiendo las peripecias de su drama, y merced a esa indeterminación del carácter, le pone repetidamente en contradicción consigo mismo" (Zorrilla makes Don Juan a skeptic or a believer depending on the drama's events, and by virtue of this indeterminacy, he brings his character repeatedly into contradiction with himself) [204]. This indeterminacy affects not only the libertine's relation to religion but also the doctrinal coherence of the play, which has been the object of debate [see Mazzeo; Abrams; Wang; Romero]. Others, curiously, detect a contradiction between the play's sound theological conception and the author, who "quizá no sabe apenas nada de teología" (perhaps knows next to nothing about theology) [Alberich 16]. Yet not only Don Juan's piety but also his seductions appear self-annulling. For Luis Fernández Cifuentes, Zorrilla's most original and thus most revealing decision is "presentar el acto de seducción engañosa en el momento mismo en que deja de serlo: la carta con que comienza el drama participa de una tradición que también cancela. En el curso de la obra, es y no es un instrumento de seducción; sin cambiar de palabras, es a la vez falsa y verdadera... " (to present the act of deceitful seduction at the very moment in which it stops being deceitful: the letter with which the play starts participates in a tradition which it also cancels. Throughout the play the letter is and is not a tool of seduction; its words are at once true and false...) [83]. In the same line of structural contradictions must be included the play's temporality, which runs counter to the causal logic of the action. As Gustavo Pérez Firmat points out: "In Juan's verses normal temporal and causal sequence collapses, for future events are always catching up and outstripping the present, as if time were circular and past, present, and future travelled the circle at different speeds" [7]. Even the play's representativeness as a privileged [End Page 49] instance of Spanish romanticism has been flatly denied in light of its inconsistencies with the patterns of that movement [Gies, "José Zorrilla"]. 2 But perhaps the most telling contradiction is the one between the play's undiminished popularity for almost a century and its author's sedulous efforts to undermine its prestige. 3Author's second thoughts? A repentant artist in ascetic revulsion against mundane acclaim? It seems reasonable to assume a link between the play's popularity and the contradictions to which it gives expression. Thus, taking at face value the tired notion that Don Juan presents a fundamentally Spanish profile, 4 I will inquire whether the play's manifest contradictions are culturally efficient. 5 To this end, I will need to consider a possible incongruity between nineteenth-century forms of consciousness and the objective historical conditions. Joaquín Casalduero already pointed out a discrepancy between historical changes and... (shrink)

Frege is celebrated as an arch-Platonist and arch-realist. He is renowned for claiming that truths of arithmetic are eternally true and independent of us, our judgments and our thoughts; that there is a third realm containing nonphysical objects that are not ideas. Until recently, there were few attempts to explicate these renowned claims, for most philosophers thought the clarity of Frege's prose rendered explication unnecessary. But the last ten years have seen the publication of several revisionist interpretations of Frege's writings (...) — interpretations on which these claims receive a very different reading. In Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge attempts to undermine this trend. Burge argues that Frege is the very Platonist most have thought him — that revisionist interpretations of Frege's Platonism, mine among them, run afoul of the words on Frege's pages. This paper is a response to Burge's criticisms. I argue that my interpretation is more faithful than Burge's to Frege's texts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Scale of the Nation in a Shrinking WorldJoan Ramon Resina (bio)The 1990s saw the rise of political issues that, although by no means new, generated a great deal of discourse based on a semantic rupture with the past. The need to inscribe political analysis with a feeling of historical acceleration was nowhere as patent as in George W. Bush's New World Order. Although the "New World Order" quickly (...) gave way to the euphemism "globalization," it soon became obvious that political agendas would change considerably as would the terms of engagement with realities that had once seemed straightforward and now appeared riddled with theoretical problems.Nationalism was salient among those realities. Although it had driven decolonization in the fifties and sixties and throughout the Vietnam era, it seemed to flare up roughly at the time when Bush pronounced the bipolar order dead. As the political map was being redrawn after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, other foci of political struggle caught the world's attention. National struggles in other regions were interpreted as collateral of that breakdown rather than long-standing symptoms of similar tensions at different scales. Once more, the European continent was caught in the incongruity of its historical processes. While Western Europe was cautiously advancing toward economic and political integration, Eastern Europe found itself returning from a "posthistorical" experiment in supranationalism to the "historical" horizon of polities being reconfigured according to such social tangibles as a common language and religion, a traditional relation to place, and shared identifying memories.Until the 1990s the West smugly believed that it had consolidated state borders around seemingly homogeneous societies. Cultural integration was flaky in spots (Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Corsica); those resistances, however, were looked on mostly as archaic irrelevances bound to disappear. But as nationalism began to haunt the cozy dream of a posthistorical balance of power, nonchalance gave way to a glut of intellectual exorcisms meant to conjure the evil that had caught at Europe's edges. In this new context, the Balkans represented for Europe, in Žižek's words, "the peculiar status of a ghost that haunts it." If the Balkans "are always somewhere else, a little bit more toward the southeast" [3], in the 1990s the danger of Balkanization seemed ubiquitous. At the time, a true Balkan hysteria rang out in the most self-satisfied European nations. In France and Spain, long-standing conflicts between center and periphery were recast in terms of the horror seen on CNN. Europe spatialized its fears, turning geographic distance into a metaphor for the racism directed against its internal others.Europe's internal others did not consist only of immigrants from non-EU countries, for whom liberals always had a soft spot, but also of those peoples and territorial units capable and culpable of tearing admirable nations apart. It was in those territorial units, which had been incorporated but not assimilated in the course of nation-state building, that nationalism was "raising its ugly head." It was here that "'reflexive' Politically Correct racism" (Žižek) applied the Balkans metaphor, projecting every conceivable horror into the intentions of unsuspecting citizens. As Žižek observed at the time, "[t]he [End Page 46] Balkans constitute a place of exception with regard to which the tolerant multiculturalist is allowed to act out his/her repressed racism" [6]. This perverse acting out was all the more acceptable, inasmuch as the peoples subjected to the logic of displaced racism were after all white and developed, and thus free game for the tolerant multiculturalist, who could always bring forward less-developed regions as potential victims of the centrifugal region's egotism. When the Balkans war broke out in May of 1991, the first Western European reactions were predominantly pro-Serbian. Never mind that Slovenia and Croatia were pro-Western and democratic. Western intelligentsias accused them of pettiness and lack of solidarity and began to restrain their large-state bias only when Serbian annexationists directed their all-out war against Bosnian Muslims, who, although white and no less developed than their attackers, were, by virtue of their religion, a patent instance of otherness. Overnight politically correct racism swung from tolerance for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Shōbōgenzō: Yui Butsu yo Butsu [and] ShōjiJoan StambaughShōbōgenzō: Yui Butsu yo Butsu [and] Shōji = [parallel French title:] Shōbōgenzō :Seul Bouddha connaît Bouddha [and] Vie-mort: Extrait de Shōbōgenzō de Dōgen Zenji[,] Maître Zen de XIIièème Sieècle = [parallel English title:] Shōbōgenzō: Only Buddha Knows Buddha [and] Life-death: Extract from Shōbōgenzō by Dōgen Zenji[,] XIIth Century Zen Master. By Dōgen. Traduit du japonais et annoté par Eido Shimano Rō (...) shi et Charles Vacher = Translated from Japanese and annotated by Eido Shimano Rō shi and Charles Vacher [trilingual edition]. La Versanne, France: Encre Marine, 1999. Pp. 152.Eidō Shimano Rōshi and Charles Vacher have completed their second effort at translating selections from Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō into English and French. Their first effort was a translation of Uji (Being-time), an early work. Now later works follow: Yui Butsu yo Butsu (Only Buddha knows Buddha) and Shōji (Life-death).The most striking feature of the translation here of the "Yui Butsu yo Butsu" fascicle is a more meaningful rendering of the title. Whereas most other translations read "Only Buddha and Buddha"—which is at best enigmatic, if not [End Page 320] unintelligible—this translation has "Only Buddha knows Buddha," a distinct improvement. The fascicle deals with the ability to know and recognize other beings of the same kind: fish knowing the fishes' heart, birds finding the birds' trail. Four-legged animals have no inkling of the birds' trail; it lies outside their ken. Similarly, an ordinary person, lacking the Buddha-eye, cannot recognize a buddha, able to see only the outside surface, only attributes and not the traces or trails. "Trace" or "trail" is intended here in the sense not of anything left over or behind—a kind of defilement—but rather of an indicator of where a buddha has gone.The phrase immediately following "Only Buddha knows Buddha" and repeated throughout the fascicle much like a Leitmotif reads: naino gūjin, complete combustion. These words are not to be found in the Sanskrit "original" text of the Lotus Sūtra, but were formulated by Kumārajīva, the translator of the Lotus Sūtra into Chinese. He was thus inspired to capture the gist of the Suō tra: only Buddha knows Buddha: complete combustion. With these words the nonduality of the working and presencing of Buddha with that of the entire universe is given expression.It is the particular merit of this translation to formulate "Only Buddha knows Buddha," in contrast to other translations that have a nearly meaningless "Only Buddha and Buddha," and to recapture Kumārajīva's brilliant interpretive words "complete combustion." The two are inseparable. When only Buddha knows Buddha, complete combustion, that is, penetration and presencing, takes place, the nonduality of samsāra and nirvāna.To say that searching for the true self is the unavoidable fate of human beings (p. 79) sounds a bit deterministic. It would perhaps be preferable to say that it is the wish or desire of all human beings.Shōji (life-death) has been used in China and Japan to translate samsāra, the repeated cycles of birth and death. The brief fascicle "Shōji" emphasizes the non-duality of samsāra and Buddha (nirvāna). Buddha or awakening is to be found in samsāra, nowhere else. The commonsense attitude is that life turns into—becomes—death. In contrast, Doōgen states that life is a temporary condition with its before and after. Thus, life is beginningless. Death is a temporary condition with its before and after. Thus, death is deathless. If we crave life and abhor death, we lose the very life of the Buddha that is to be found nowhere else than in the midst of the whole of birth-life-death.The fascicle concludes with the admonition to remain unattached, yet to have compassion for all beings.This process of birth-life-death is not something that begins at physical birth and terminates with physical death, but is ongoing from moment to moment. Thus... (shrink)

Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance, based on a Cambridge dissertation, is a reaction to two related trends in recent writing about early modern European travel literature, both ultimately deriving from the “Orientalist” model presented in the work of Edward Said on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These are the trend that views travelers' accounts as more revelatory of European concerns than of the reality of the non‐European societies they wrote about and the trend that analyzes these texts using the (...) techniques of literary criticism and scholarship rather than those of historical investigation. Joan‐Pau Rubiés argues, by contrast, that the texts were the product of a genuine, although sometimes distorted, cultural encounter between Europeans and others; the argument relies on a case study of European writing about south India, particularly the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara. The south Indian literature is less well known than that produced by early modern travelers to larger states such as China and the Ottoman Empire. Even in examining accounts of India itself, the Muslim Mughals of north India get more attention. Rubiés's task is complicated by the fact that there are so many mysteries in Vijayanagara history. The book will sometimes be heavy going for those unacquainted with south Indian history and culture.Rather than beginning with the Portuguese invasion of the Indian Ocean at the end of the fifteenth century, Rubiés starts with Marco Polo and discusses fifteenth‐century Italian accounts. This emphasizes the continuity between the late Middle Ages, when Europeans arrived as travelers or merchants, and the early modern period, when Europeans were associated with an imperial project. The bulk of Rubiés's analysis is devoted to a group of texts produced by sixteenth‐century Italian and Portuguese travelers. These travelers and missionaries in south India are less well known in the English historical literature than are their British and French equivalents, and Rubiés has unearthed some fascinating characters. Rubiés defends the accuracy, perceptiveness, and open‐mindedness of the Western observers from charges of ethnocentrism. Since so much contemporary scholarly knowledge of early modern Vijayanagara is derived from these Western travelers' accounts, lauding them for their accuracy involves an obvious problem of circularity, which Rubiés attempts to evade by asserting the accounts' consistency with recently obtained archaeological data.By contrast with the Latin Christian writers whose perceptive readings of Vijayanagara's culture Rubiés lauds, the Muslim writers of north India who wrote about Vijayanagara come off very poorly. Rubiés finds them, despite some insights, mostly unable to break from the paradigm of “holy war,” a permanent structural conflict between Muslims and idolators, to perceive Vijayanagara as it was. In this case it is the Orientals who are the Orientalists.The European writers employed two distinct sets of categories for the analysis of Vijayanagara, one historical, in which Vijayanagara was analyzed in terms of its conformation to an ideal of “civilization,” and one religious, in which it was negatively evaluated as “idolatrous.” Rubiés claims that these travelers' accounts had major effects on the culture of Europe itself, in which the historical discourse expanded and partially incorporated the religious discourse. In a way reminiscent of traditional European intellectual historians such as Paul Hazard, Rubiés finds travel literature, with its interest in human diversity, to be a root of the Enlightenment. His case against the applicability of the Orientalist paradigm is convincing.Although it is, unfortunately, priced beyond the reach of most scholars, this book will be of interest to students of the origins of ethnography and anthropology. Cambridge University Press and the author deserve praise for producing a book with proper bottom‐of‐the‐page footnotes, a full bibliography, and a fine index. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Gandhi's Hope: Learning from Other Religions as a Path to PeaceChristopher Key ChappleGandhi's Hope: Learning from Other Religions as a Path to Peace. By Jay McDaniel. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005. 134 + viii pp.This book by prominent Protestant theologian Jay McDaniel suggests that Mahatma Gandhi challenged the modern world by publicly revealing that which he learned from other faith traditions and advocating this path as a way (...) for intercultural understanding. The wisdom of Gandhi holds special poignancy today, when the processes of globalization and migration have placed followers of different faiths in closer proximity than can be remembered in the past five hundred years.Jay McDaniel writes with crisp clarity and organizes his insights into bite-sized pieces. He lays out five challenges that face all the world's faiths: compassion, self-criticism, simple living, ecological awareness, and welcoming religious diversity. In approaching this decidedly postmodern list of issues, McDaniel draws from two primary resources: the experiences shared by his students at Hendrix College and the writings of Alfred North Whitehead. Along the way, he invokes the Buddhist teacher and leader Thich Nhat Hanh and several progressive Catholics, including Sister Joan Chittester and theologians Hans Küng and Paul Knitter.Continuing with a style developed in his earlier books, McDaniel latches onto a [End Page 237] metaphor and extends it to illustrate his central point—in this case, the value of diversity. In past books, he has used the image of the hunter and the hunted to underscore the need to respect animals. In Gandhi's Hope, the metaphor he employs is that of a jazz concert, with all different manner of instruments pooling their resources to create a tapestry of diverse yet harmonious music.Although the title of the book may seem to indicate that Gandhi will serve as thefocus, in fact, Whitehead anchors McDaniel's approach. Through an updated approach to Whitehead, McDaniel seeks to answer the questions regarding diversity and compassion that he has posed. He suggests that an experience of concrescence will result in the sort of heightened awareness needed to increase one's conscience and to make the ethical changes needed to respond to the current state of the world. McDaniel identifies twelve "planks" that will usher Whitehead's vision into the contemporary world. These twelve aspects seem also to be heavily influenced by McDaniel's own encounter with Buddhism: interdependence, impermanence, indeterminism, mind/matter, deep listening, value, God, creativity, persuasive power, divine empathy, many forms of salvation, and life after death. These broad categories embrace key notions found in all religious traditions. Some traditions emphasize certain aspects more than others. Buddhists cleave to impermanence and Jews to establishing a covenant with God, but Jews also recognize that all things will pass, and Buddhists revere their great teacher and many strive to emulate his experience through techniques akin to those who worship God.In order for religious traditions to maintain their urgency and relevance, McDaniel suggests that they must respond actively to the looming threat of environmental degradation. Consumer culture drives people into a state of indifference about natural resources, and arrogance prevents people from taking an interest in the life patterns and cultures of others. These tendencies lie at the root of the world's troubles. McDaniel suggests that process theology can remedy these ills by calling people into a state of compassion and can help guide people toward adopting thoughtful self-criticism, to living a more simple life, to recognizing the importance of other living beings and ecosystems, and to celebrating diversity of cultures. Echoing a refrain long associated with process thought, McDaniel writes "the universe is a creative and creating process of interdependent events, lured by but not controlled by God, such that the future is not yet decided, not even by God" (p. 71). To the extent that religions sustain themselves by reinforcing separateness and promoting a narrow cultural identity and/or an unthinking fundamentalism, they can be an impediment to peace, which, for McDaniel, is an important goal of the world's religions.When attempting to theologize about ultimate matters, McDaniel posits "four faces of the sacred," which he lists as the Abyss... (shrink)

This paper offers a critical overview of Lewis’ theory of singular causation running from his origins to his last words on the issue . In sections 1 and 2, I characterize Lewis’ original theory of causation backed in terms of counterfactual dependence as opposed to regularity theories and also his two 1986a proposals of modification, prompted by cases of late preemption. In section 4, I examine the main problems of the 1986a proposals which lead Lewis to his last analysis of (...) causation in terms of influence . In section 5, I discuss the merits of Lewis last proposal as to the problems of late preemption and spurious causation. I also argue against Lewis’ idea that his theory of influence can deal with trumping preemption cases. Besides, a general and severe problem of the overall counterfactual conception of causality is highlighted: the status of backtracking counterfactuals. (shrink)

EI desarrollo de su teoría de las leyes como relaciones entre universales condujo a Armstrong a establecer un marco metafísico general mas complejo que el que sus anteriores trabajos presentaban. En este artículo se exponen los aspectos principales de la metafísica de particulares y universales exigida por la identificación original de Armstrong de las leyes con estados de cosas universales. Además, se presentan diversas dificultades que pueden hallarse en su propuesta, y algunas soluciones para las mismas. Los temas principales que (...) se discuten son las leyes con excepciones, las leyes con restriccionesespacio-temporales, las leyes probabilísticas y las leyes no ejemplificadas.The development of his theory of laws as relations between universals led Armstrong to set up a more complex general metaphysical framework than that advanced in his previous works. In this paper I present the main traits of the metaphysics of properties and particulars required by Armstrongsoriginal identification of laws with universal states of affairs. Besides, I advance some serious drawbacks that can be found in his proposal and I also offer some solutions to them. The main subjects to be discussed here will be laws with exceptions, laws with spatio-temporal limitations, probabilistic laws and uninstantiated laws. (shrink)

This paper aims to trace the evolution of Bachelard's thought as he gropes toward a concrete formulation of a philosophy of the imagination. Reverie, the creative daydream, occupies the central position in Bachelard's emerging metaphysic, which becomes increasingly “phenomenological” in a manner reminiscent of Husserl. This means that although Bachelard does not use Husserlian terms, he appropriates the following features of (Husserlian) phenomenology: 1. a desire to “embracket” the initial (rationalistic) impulse; and 2. an aspiration to apprehend in its entirety, (...) the creative epiphany of an image. Ultimately, this paper aims to show that there is a sense in which Bachelard's metaphysical concerns in his poetics are an outgrowth of (rather than radical break from) his earlier scientific and epistemological concerns. What results in reverie is an aesthetic intentionality providing a metaphysic of the imagination: the aesthetic object, such as fire or water, is an object only insofar as it enables/calls forth a subject to enter into a receptive, self-aware and cosmic state of being; subject-ness and object-ness are intimately and archetypally intertwined. Bachelard's “new poetics” results from his transplantation/cross-fertilization of the general epistemology of the “new scientific spirit” on to/across his aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper advances a criticism of Parsons' notion of truthmaker grounded on the notion of supervenience. I argue that none of the two naturalinterpretations of Parsons' definition succeeds in accomplishing the several tasks intended by Parsons.

Advance care planning (ACP) is a process that seeks to elicit patients’ goals, values, and preferences for future medical care. While most commonly employed in adult patients, pediatric ACP is becoming a standard of practice for adolescent and young adult patients with potentially life-limiting illnesses. The majority of research has focused on patients and their families; little attention has been paid to the perspectives of healthcare providers (HCPs) regarding their perspectives on the process and its potential benefits and limitations. Focus (...) groups were conducted with 15 physicians as part of a larger study of adolescent and young adult ACP in hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) patients. This study identified two categories important to the utility of ACP in pediatric HSCT patients; (1) the temporal context of ACP and decision making and (2) the limitations of pediatric ACP, with subcategories identified as (a) embodied and witnessed knowing, (b) the impact of clinical cascades—when the treatment of one organ system creates complications in another system that needs to be treated—and a creation of a “new normal” following complications of illness and its treatment in the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU), (c) the balancing of adolescents’ autonomy with their capacity to make informed medical decisions, and (d) the epistemological frames that differ between HCP and patients and their families. These findings support ACP in adolescent and young adult HSCT patients, with a number of implications for practice as this process becomes more common. (shrink)

There is little fear that the concept of motivational bias as proposed by Mele is likely to dampen the current academic ferment (see Mele's Introduction) with respect to self-deception for several reasons: (a) like philosophy, science has more recently abandoned the heuristic of a rational human mind; (b) the concept is parsimonious, applicable to many research topics other than self-deception, and, therefore, scientifically serviceable; (c) as a proximal mechanism it addresses process rather than function, that is, how rather than why (...) questions; (d) it is not as interesting a question as why there is a high prevalence of “real” self-deception (i.e., “garden-variety self-deception” as described by Mele, see sect. 6); and (e) a more penetrating issue is whether “real” self-deception is adaptive. (shrink)

El liberalisme polític és la ideologia o tradició política dominant de les nostres democràcies occidentals. Ho és tant des del punt de vista històric, pel que fa a les seves conquestes institucionals, com des del punt de vista del pensament, pel.